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Abstract
Arguments in favor of injecting symbolic knowledge into
neural architectures abound. When done right, constraining
a sub-symbolic model can substantially improve its perfor-
mance, sample complexity, interpretability, and can prevent
it from predicting invalid configurations. Focusing on deep
probabilistic (logical) graphical models – i.e., constrained
joint distributions whose parameters are determined (in part)
by neural nets based on low-level inputs – we draw atten-
tion to an elementary but unintended consequence of sym-
bolic knowledge: that the resulting constraints can propagate
the negative effects of adversarial examples.
Introduction
Deep probabilistic (logical) graphical models (dPGMs) tie
together a sub-symbolic level that processes low-level in-
puts with a symbolic level that handles logical and prob-
abilistic inference, see for instance (De Raedt et al. 2019).
The two levels are often implemented with k neu-
ral networks and one probabilistic (logical) graphical
models, respectively. Prominent examples of dPGMs in-
clude DeepProbLog (Manhaeve et al. 2018) and “neural”
extensions of Markov Logic (Lippi and Frasconi 2009;
Marra and Kuzˇelka 2019). In this preliminary investiga-
tion, we show with a concrete toy example that fool-
ing a single neural network with an adversarial exam-
ple (Szegedy et al. 2013; Biggio and Roli 2018) can corrupt
the state of multiple output variables. We develop an intu-
ition of this phenomenon and show that it occurs despite
the model being probabilistic and regardless of whether the
symbolic knowledge is factually correct.
Deep Probabilistic-Logical Models
We restrict ourselves to deep Bayesian networks (dBNs),
i.e., directed dPGMs stripped of their logical compo-
nent. (Our arguments do transfer to other dPGMs and
deep statistical-relational models too.) These models are
Bayesian networks where some conditional distributions are
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implemented as neural networks feeding on low-level in-
puts, and (roughly speaking) correspond to ground Deep-
ProbLog models.
Let us illustrate them with a restricted version of the ad-
dition example from (Manhaeve et al. 2018): the goal is to
recognize the digits x1, x2 ∈ {1, . . . , 4} appearing in two
MNIST images z1 and z2, knowing that the digits satisfy the
constraint ϕ = (x1 + x2 = 5). Notice that the only valid
predictions are (1, 4), (2, 3), (3, 2), (4, 1).
Let x = (x1, x2) and z = (z1, z2). Our dBN for this prob-
lem defines a joint distribution P(x | z;ϕ) built on the con-
ditionals P(x1 | z1), P(x2 | z2) and on ϕ. In particular, the
probability of the event Xi = xi is implemented as a Con-
vNet with a softmax output layer applied to zi. The dBN
is consistent with the symbolic knowledge ϕ in that it en-
sures that the joint distribution satisfies P(x | z;ϕ) = 0 for
all x 6|= ϕ. This is achieved by taking an unconstrained joint
distribution P(x | z) =
∏
i P(xi | zi) and constraining it:
P(x | z;ϕ) = P(x | z)1 {x |= ϕ} /Z (1)
Here Z =
∑
x|=ϕ P(x | z) is a normalization constant and
the sum runs over all x’s consistent with ϕ. A joint pre-
diction is obtained via maximum a-posteriori (MAP) infer-
ence (Koller and Friedman 2009):
F (z) = argmaxx P(x | z;ϕ) (2)
If no symbolic knowledge ϕ was given, the most likely out-
puts would simply be (f1(z1), f2(z2)), where:
fi(zi) = argmaxxi P(xi | zi) (3)
Finally, we use the same ConvNet for both images, and let
f=f1=f2.
Adversarial Examples and Constraints
Consider a pair of images z representing a 1 and a 4, respec-
tively, and let the ConvNet output the following conditional
probabilities:
P(X1 | z1) = (0.9, 0.1, 0, 0) (4)
P(X2 | z2) =
(
1
4
− ǫ
3
, 1
4
− ǫ
3
, 1
4
− ǫ
3
, 1
4
+ ǫ
)
(5)
for some small ǫ, e.g., 0.001. Although the second image
is rather uninformative, the unconstrained dPGM gets both
digits right, with joint probability ≈ 0.226 (by Eq. 3) and
so does the constrained classifier, with probability ≈ 0.9
(Eq. 2). In this case, the symbolic knowledge boosts the con-
fidence of the model, a desirable and expected result.
Now, perturbing zi by δi shifts the conditional distribu-
tion output by the ConvNet from P(xi | zi) to P(xi | zi + δi)
and hence changes the probabilities assigned to the possi-
ble outcomes Xi. Intuitively, a perturbation is adversarial if
it is at the same time imperceptible and it forces MAP in-
ference to output a wrong configuration. In other words, as-
suming that zi is classified correctly, zi + δi is adversarial if
f(zi + δi) 6= f(zi) and ‖δi‖ is “small” for some norm ‖ · ‖.
It is well known that neural networks are often suscepti-
ble to rather eye-catching adversarial perturbations that can
alter their output by arbitrary amounts (Szegedy et al. 2013;
Biggio and Roli 2018). Thus it is not too far fetched to imag-
ine a perturbation δ1 that induces the following conditional
distribution on the first digit:
P(X1 | z1 + δ1) = (0.1, 0.9, 0, 0) (6)
Now, it can be readily verified that this perturbation forces
the unconstrained dBN to predict (2, 4) with joint proba-
bility ≈ 0.226 (which is symmetrical to the above case).
Clearly this model is fooled by the adversarial image into
making a mistake on x1, but the damage is limited to the
first digit: x2 is still predicted correctly.
However (2, 4) does violate the symbolic knowledge
ϕ, while the constrained dBN is forced to output a valid
prediction, namely the most likely configuration out of
{(1, 4), (2, 3), (3, 2), (4, 1)}. Given the above conditional
distributions and ǫ, the constrained dBN outputs (2, 3) with
probability ≈ 0.9. This prediction is definitely consistent
with ϕ, but now both digits are classified wrongly.
Discussion
The toy example above illustrates the perhaps elementary
but seemingly neglected fact that symbolic knowledge can
propagate the negative effects of adversarial examples. This
occurs because the model trades off predictive loss in ex-
change for satisfying a hard constraint.
While our example is decidedly toy, it is easy to see that
the same phenomenon could occur in relevant sensitive ap-
plications. The phenomenon is also likely to transfer to undi-
rected dPGMs like deep extensions of Markov Logic Net-
works (Lippi and Frasconi 2009; Marra and Kuzˇelka 2019).
We make a couple of important remarks. First, depending
on the structure of the symbolic knowledge, fooling a single
neural networks in the dPGMmay perturb any subset of out-
put variables. Thus, seeking robustness of a single network
is not enough and all k networks must be robustified. Sec-
ond, this may not be enough either: if an adversary manages
to fool a robustified neural network – even by random luck
– the effects of fooling will still cascade across the model.
Thus the dPGM as a wholemust be made robust, in the sense
that all CPTs appearing in it – not only the ConvNets – must
be made robust. Finally, it may be the case that access to
the symbolic knowledge might help attackers in designing
minimal targeted attacks that induce any target variable.
Adversarial examples in dPGMs can be under-
stood through the lens of sensitivity analysis for di-
rected (Chan and Darwiche 2002) and undirected proba-
bilistic graphical models (Chan and Darwiche 2005); see
especially (Chan and Darwiche 2006). These works show
how to constrain a probabilistic graphical model to ensure
that the probabilities of different queries are sufficiently
far apart. These constraints could be injected into standard
adversarial training routines for neural networks to en-
courage global robustness of the dPGM. Of course, robust
training of complex dPGMs is likely to be computationally
challenging. Algebraic model counting in the sensitivity
semiring might prove useful in tackling this computational
challenge (Kimmig, Van den Broeck, and De Raedt 2017).
References
[Biggio and Roli 2018] Biggio, B., and Roli, F. 2018. Wild
patterns: Ten years after the rise of adversarial machine
learning. Pattern Recognition 84.
[Chan and Darwiche 2002] Chan, H., and Darwiche, A.
2002. When do numbers really matter? Journal of artifi-
cial intelligence research 17.
[Chan and Darwiche 2005] Chan, H., and Darwiche, A.
2005. Sensitivity analysis in Markov networks. In In-
ternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol-
ume 19.
[Chan and Darwiche 2006] Chan, H., and Darwiche, A.
2006. On the robustness of most probable explanations.
In Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Conference on Uncer-
tainty in Artificial Intelligence. AUAI Press.
[De Raedt et al. 2019] De Raedt, L.; Manhaeve, R.; Duman-
cic, S.; Demeester, T.; and Kimmig, A. 2019. Neuro-
Symbolic= Neural + Logical + Probabilistic. In NeSy’19@
IJCAI, the 14th International Workshop on Neural-Symbolic
Learning and Reasoning.
[Kimmig, Van den Broeck, and De Raedt 2017] Kimmig,
A.; Van den Broeck, G.; and De Raedt, L. 2017. Algebraic
model counting. Journal of Applied Logic 22.
[Koller and Friedman 2009] Koller, D., and Friedman, N.
2009. Probabilistic graphical models: principles and tech-
niques.
[Lippi and Frasconi 2009] Lippi, M., and Frasconi, P. 2009.
Prediction of protein β-residue contacts by markov logic
networks with grounding-specific weights. Bioinformatics
25(18).
[Manhaeve et al. 2018] Manhaeve, R.; Dumancic, S.; Kim-
mig, A.; Demeester, T.; and De Raedt, L. 2018. Deep-
ProbLog: Neural probabilistic logic programming. In Ad-
vances in Neural Information Processing Systems.
[Marra and Kuzˇelka 2019] Marra, G., and Kuzˇelka, O.
2019. Neural Markov Logic Networks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1905.13462.
[Szegedy et al. 2013] Szegedy, C.; Zaremba, W.; Sutskever,
I.; Bruna, J.; Erhan, D.; Goodfellow, I.; and Fergus, R. 2013.
Intriguing properties of neural networks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1312.6199.
